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UK regulators set out quantum security preparations

UK financial regulators have outlined practical steps for preparing critical systems for quantum computing threats. The guidance covers cryptographic inventories, migration planning, supplier readiness and the operational risks of replacing…

UK regulators set out quantum security preparations
Summary
  • The Bank of England, PRA and FCA have published effective practices for managing quantum-related cybersecurity risks.
  • Financial institutions are encouraged to inventory cryptographic dependencies, prioritise sensitive information and essential services, and assess supplier migration plans.
  • The guidance also addresses crypto agility, hybrid cryptographic arrangements, testing and recovery, without setting a mandatory migration deadline.

UK financial institutions are being encouraged to map the cryptographic technologies supporting their critical services and prepare for potentially extensive changes as quantum computing develops.

The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority published effective practices for managing quantum-related cyber risks on 19 November 2026. The document covers cryptographic inventories, migration planning, supplier coordination and the operational consequences of replacing existing protections.

The regulators note that no cryptographically relevant quantum computer capable of undermining widely deployed public-key cryptography is currently known to exist. Nevertheless, the time required to prepare complex financial infrastructure supports beginning the work before such systems emerge.

The practices complement the regulators' wider consultation on cyber resilience but are not formal supervisory expectations. Institutions can adopt them in proportion to their activities and risk profiles.

Cryptographic inventories establish the scale of migration

Public-key cryptography supports secure communications, authentication, digital signatures and other functions used throughout financial markets.

A sufficiently capable quantum computer could undermine some of the mathematical problems on which existing algorithms depend, potentially weakening protections used by financial institutions and their service providers.

Replacing vulnerable methods requires an accurate understanding of where they operate. The regulators recommend inventories covering applications, databases, certificates, public-key infrastructure, network connections, authentication systems, backups and operational technology.

The inventory must also account for external dependencies. A financial institution may control its internal applications while relying on cloud platforms, payment processors, specialist software or market infrastructure providers for cryptographic functions.

Without information about those systems, it can be difficult to determine which algorithms need changing or whether the organisation can complete a migration independently.

Some legacy applications may have cryptographic methods embedded in their design, while specialised hardware may not support newer algorithms without replacement.

Consequently, developing an inventory also provides a basis for estimating the time, expenditure and operational changes that migration may require.

Long-lived information requires earlier attention

The regulators identify the possibility of harvest now, decrypt later attacks as an important factor in assessing risk.

An attacker could collect encrypted information using current technology and retain it in the hope that a future quantum computer will provide a means of decryption.

The exposure depends on the cryptographic methods involved, the availability of the captured information and the period during which it must remain confidential.

Some financial information may lose its sensitivity relatively quickly, while customer identity records, confidential transactions and commercially significant documents can remain valuable for years.

A migration completed in the future cannot retrospectively prevent collection of encrypted information before the new protections were deployed.

The guidance therefore recommends prioritising systems and data according to sensitivity, required protection lifetime, business criticality and the time needed to make changes.

Digital signatures and authentication mechanisms present separate considerations. If their underlying algorithms eventually became vulnerable, organisations might need to restore trust in the identities, transactions or software they authenticate.

The resulting priorities cannot be determined simply by listing every system using public-key cryptography. They depend on the operational role of each system and the consequences of losing confidentiality, integrity or trusted authentication.

Migration must protect operational resilience

Moving to post-quantum cryptography may involve changes to software libraries, certificates, network protocols and hardware security systems.

Financial institutions need to establish whether replacement technologies work with existing infrastructure and whether the changes affect processing capacity, availability or the reliability of interconnected services.

The regulators encourage phased migration, supported by testing and arrangements for addressing changes that fail or produce unexpected consequences.

They also identify hybrid cryptographic solutions, which combine conventional and quantum-resistant algorithms, as a possible interim measure during transition.

Such arrangements require their own risk assessments. Running two cryptographic mechanisms together can introduce additional implementation complexity, while organisations must still progress towards an appropriate longer-term design.

Testing needs to examine whether new protections operate correctly under realistic conditions and whether systems can recover safely if an upgrade causes disruption.

Rollback procedures also require particular care. Restoring availability through an earlier configuration could unintentionally return a system to cryptographic methods the migration was intended to replace.

Third-party migration plans affect completion dates

Financial services depend on connections between organisations, making compatibility a significant part of the transition.

A bank may be ready to introduce a quantum-resistant authentication mechanism while a payment processor or software supplier remains dependent on older technology.

The regulators recommend examining the readiness of material third parties, including their cryptographic dependencies, development schedules and ability to support planned upgrades.

Procurement and contractual arrangements may also need updating so institutions can obtain the information and cooperation required for migration.

Those dependencies do not transfer responsibility for quantum-related risk to a supplier. The regulated organisation remains accountable for assessing the consequences for its own services.

Board oversight is therefore part of the recommended approach, with migration programmes supported by documented milestones, resources and information about the readiness of priority systems.

Cryptographic agility supports future changes

The guidance also encourages crypto agility: designing systems so that cryptographic algorithms can be changed as technology and standards develop.

That capability matters because a quantum-resistant algorithm adopted today may itself require replacement following new research or operational experience.

Applications that make it difficult to change cryptographic methods can turn each subsequent update into another expensive migration project.

The UK publication follows growing international attention to quantum-related financial risk, including a separate report from securities regulator IOSCO issued on the same day.

The regulators have not prescribed a universal migration deadline. Their recommendations concentrate on establishing the dependencies, governance and technical arrangements that will determine whether financial institutions can complete the transition without unnecessary disruption to essential services.

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