Summary
- The FCA, PRA and Bank of England opened a joint consultation on cyber risk and resilience management on 19 November.
- The proposals clarify existing requirements covering governance, asset inventories, protection, monitoring, testing and recovery.
- The consultation closes on 26 February 2027, with final guidance expected in the first half of 2027.
UK financial regulators have proposed clearer expectations for how financial institutions manage cyber risk and recover from attacks, placing particular emphasis on board accountability, critical technology dependencies and the effectiveness of incident response arrangements.
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Bank of England opened a joint consultation on 19 November 2026. Published as FCA GC26/9 and PRA CP17/26, the proposals bring together existing regulatory requirements and supervisory experience into a common approach to cyber resilience.
The consultation does not propose new rules. Instead, it sets out principles-based expectations concerning governance, operational risk, resilience and third-party risk management, allowing firms to determine proportionate arrangements for their activities.
The regulators reported that October 2026 saw the second-highest monthly number of cyber incidents reported to the FCA in five years, exceeding the previous 18-month peak recorded in May 2025 by 52%.
Senior management responsibility becomes more explicit
The draft guidance expects boards and senior managers to take responsibility for cyber risk, with a named senior manager overseeing the relevant arrangements.
That responsibility requires more than confirmation that technical security measures are in place. Management needs reliable information about material exposures, the effectiveness of existing controls and the organisation's ability to recover services when an incident occurs.
Financial firms must also maintain an understanding of their critical assets and the dependencies supporting them. These may include customer-facing applications, payment infrastructure, internal systems, information stores and technology operated by external suppliers.
Without a current inventory, an organisation may struggle to determine which services are affected by a compromised supplier or which infrastructure should receive priority when systems are being restored.
The proposed approach connects cyber risk management with the wider operational resilience arrangements already required of regulated firms. A system's technical importance must be considered alongside the business activities that depend on it.
For example, a compromised authentication service may support several applications, while a shared data platform could affect multiple business processes even if the initial incident is confined to one environment.
Detection and recovery require regular testing
The consultation calls for layered security protections, including appropriate controls over access to systems, physical assets and information.
Monitoring arrangements should enable organisations to identify suspicious activity promptly, while tested incident response plans should establish how affected services can be contained and recovered.
The regulators also emphasise regular security testing and the use of lessons from actual incidents and exercises to improve resilience.
These requirements address an important distinction between the design of security controls and their effectiveness during an attack. An organisation may have documented response procedures without establishing whether those arrangements work when staff, infrastructure or suppliers are unavailable.
Recovery testing can expose dependencies that are difficult to identify through conventional security assessments. A restored application, for example, may remain unusable if its identity service or supporting database has not been recovered.
Similarly, isolating compromised infrastructure may reduce further exposure while interrupting legitimate activity. Firms need established decision-making arrangements for such situations, particularly where measures could affect important business services.
The proposed guidance aligns with the National Cyber Security Centre's Cyber Assessment Framework, which the regulators encourage firms to use when assessing governance, protection, detection and response capabilities.
Third-party dependencies remain a central concern
Financial institutions rely on cloud providers, software developers, managed technology services and other external organisations whose infrastructure can support essential operations.
A failure or compromise affecting one provider can consequently create problems for several financial institutions, particularly where they depend on common technology or shared operational services.
The consultation expects firms to maintain an inventory of significant third-party dependencies and understand the cyber risks they introduce.
Contractual arrangements and supplier assurance can contribute to that work, but they cannot replace an institution's own responsibility for managing the effects of technology disruption.
Firms must determine whether they can continue important activities when a supplier becomes unavailable and how information needed for recovery would be obtained during an incident.
The proposals are intended to apply proportionately, with relevance depending on the institution's size, complexity and exposure. The principal scope includes UK banks, building societies, certain investment firms, Solvency II insurers, recognised investment exchanges, and specified payment and electronic money institutions.
Credit unions, non-Solvency II insurers and other excluded categories of FCA-regulated businesses are not directly covered by the proposed guidance, although the regulator encourages them to consider its principles.
Consultation runs until February
The regulators have separately published effective-practice documents addressing artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Those publications complement the cyber resilience consultation but are not themselves part of the proposed formal guidance.
Responses to GC26/9 and CP17/26 are invited until Friday 26 February 2027. Following consideration of the feedback, the FCA expects final guidance to be published during the first half of 2027.
The consultation's proposed expectations would clarify how existing regulatory requirements apply to cyber risk rather than create an additional standalone set of rules.





