Summary
- Trezor has confirmed malicious hardware implants in three Safe 5 devices purchased through Indonesian reseller CryptoBilis.
- Firmware version 2.13.1 prevents the identified implants from capturing further information, but cannot reverse earlier exposure.
- The manufacturer has reduced its reseller network by approximately 80% and introduced tighter distribution controls, while finding no confirmed losses linked to the implants.
Three Trezor hardware wallets have been confirmed to contain malicious electronic implants capable of capturing sensitive recovery information, prompting the Czech manufacturer to introduce firmware protections and substantially reduce its reseller network.
Trezor disclosed the findings on 12 November following an investigation into suspected tampering with a Safe 5 device purchased through Indonesian reseller CryptoBilis. Two additional devices have since been identified with the same type of implant, bringing the number of confirmed cases to three.
All three devices were purchased between 20 August and 23 September 2026 through CryptoBilis, including its Tokopedia and Shopee storefronts and direct sales.
The manufacturer has found no confirmed implants in other Trezor models or devices purchased through different resellers. No affected customer has reported losing funds, although the investigation remains open.
Additional circuitry intercepted display information
Trezor’s embedded engineering team examined firmware recovered from the first identified implant, establishing how the additional electronic component operated.
The malicious board had been inserted between the Safe 5’s main circuit board and its display. Rather than modifying the wallet’s ordinary firmware or interfering directly with its Secure Element, the implant monitored information passing to the screen.
That position allowed it to capture information displayed during legitimate operations, including wallet recovery words and passphrases.
Recovery words are particularly sensitive because they can be used to restore access to a cryptocurrency wallet independently of the original device. An attacker who obtains the relevant recovery information may therefore be able to access the wallet without possessing the compromised hardware.
The implant was designed to recognise the appearance of recovery information, encrypt the captured data and transmit it through a mobile network connection to infrastructure controlled by the attackers.
If connectivity was unavailable, the component could retain the information and attempt transmission later. Its operation did not require visible changes to the wallet’s normal interface, making the device potentially appear functional to its owner.
This approach bypassed the protections traditionally associated with maintaining the integrity of a hardware wallet’s main firmware. The Secure Element remained outside the implant’s direct control, but sensitive information became exposed through the display connection.
Trezor has not identified who installed the malicious components or established how the devices were modified within the distribution process.
Investigation confirms three affected devices
The company began examining devices after receiving the original report of suspected tampering in October. Of the three confirmed cases, one device was analysed in Trezor’s laboratory, while the other two were identified using photographs of their internal circuitry supplied by customers.
By 12 November, 48 customers who had purchased through CryptoBilis had contacted the manufacturer. Their devices were being assessed either directly or through internal photographs.
Trezor also examined products supplied through other resellers in the region, finding no evidence of similar tampering in the devices checked.
These results narrow the confirmed scope of the compromise without establishing that every affected device has been identified. The company continues to investigate and has committed to disclosing additional findings if other reseller channels or product models are implicated.
Its current assessment is that the implants are limited to the identified Safe 5 devices sold through CryptoBilis during the August and September purchase window.
Firmware protection cannot reverse earlier exposure
On 11 November, Trezor released Safe 5 firmware version 2.13.1 with a protection designed to prevent the identified implants from capturing further information.
The manufacturer says the update renders the discovered batch of implants ineffective for new capture attempts. However, it cannot protect recovery information that may already have been intercepted before the software was installed.
Customers who purchased devices through CryptoBilis have therefore been advised to move their funds to a new wallet using newly generated recovery information, rather than assuming that a firmware update alone eliminates every consequence of potential compromise.
Trezor has also introduced a replacement programme covering customers who purchased its products from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards. Alternative arrangements are available where shipping restrictions prevent a particular replacement device from being delivered.
The company has worked with the Security Alliance’s SEAL 911 emergency response service during its investigation.
Distribution controls undergo substantial changes
The response extends beyond the affected devices. Trezor has removed approximately 80% of resellers from its distribution network and introduced more restrictive requirements for those that remain.
The new arrangements address how products are sourced, stored and accessed before reaching customers. Trezor says the removed partners were not necessarily suspected of misconduct and that their exclusion reflected the company’s decision to operate a smaller network under stricter controls.
Physical product integrity creates a different security problem from conventional software vulnerabilities. A device can contain authentic firmware and correctly functioning protected components while an additional circuit intercepts information elsewhere in the hardware.
For manufacturers supplying security-sensitive equipment, protection therefore extends to storage, handling, logistics and custody after production. The security of an individual product depends partly on whether unauthorised modification can occur before the customer receives it.
These considerations also apply to enterprise authentication devices, security appliances and other hardware used in trusted environments. Product assurance requires attention to the physical delivery process as well as the software and components designed to protect information once the device is operating.
Trezor says its investigation has found no confirmed losses associated with the three implants. The manufacturer continues to examine customer reports and has committed to further updates if additional affected devices, product models or financial losses are established.





