Decoding the world of cybersecurity

IOSCO urges financial sector quantum preparations

Global securities regulators have urged financial institutions to accelerate quantum security planning. IOSCO warns that replacing vulnerable cryptography could take years, leaving critical services exposed if sufficiently powerful quantum computers…

IOSCO urges financial sector quantum preparations
Summary
  • IOSCO's 19 November report identifies quantum computing as a significant future threat to cryptography supporting financial markets.
  • Most observed preparedness activity remains at an early stage, concentrated on governance, inventories and initial migration planning.
  • Regulators are urging firms to test quantum-resistant technologies, assess supplier dependencies and develop cryptographic agility rather than wait for a technological breakthrough.

Financial institutions have been urged to accelerate preparations for quantum computing threats, with global securities regulators warning that replacing vulnerable cryptography across critical financial systems could take several years.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published its report on the implications of quantum computing for financial markets on 19 November 2026, identifying potential consequences for secure communications, authentication, transactions and blockchain infrastructure.

Although practical quantum computers capable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography are not currently known to exist, IOSCO considers the preparation challenge immediate because financial institutions depend on complex systems that cannot be upgraded quickly.

Some industry participants consulted during the research believe organisations should prepare for the possibility that such capabilities could emerge within five years. That scenario is not a confirmed timetable or a definitive IOSCO prediction.

Financial infrastructure depends on vulnerable cryptography

Public-key cryptography underpins several functions used throughout financial markets, including digital signatures, secure communications and mechanisms for establishing trusted connections between systems.

These protections are embedded in applications, network infrastructure and services operated by external providers.

Replacing them will require institutions to identify where vulnerable algorithms are used, determine which alternatives are supported and establish whether existing systems can accommodate the changes.

The complexity increases where financial services depend on older technology or interactions involving multiple organisations.

Payment infrastructure, for example, may require several participants to agree on compatible protocols before a new cryptographic mechanism can be deployed reliably.

Changes can also affect processing performance, software compatibility and recovery arrangements. A cryptographic migration may therefore involve extensive testing and coordination rather than a routine software update.

Simon Pamplin, chief technology officer at Certes, said legacy technology would complicate the transition.

“Changing that cryptography is rarely straightforward, particularly when those systems underpin payments, transactions and other critical financial services.”

Where applications depend on external suppliers, institutions may have limited direct control over upgrade schedules. The readiness of cloud providers, network operators and software vendors can consequently determine how quickly a financial organisation can replace particular cryptographic dependencies.

Exposure can begin before quantum systems arrive

The potential for future decryption also creates a risk for information that organisations are protecting today.

Under a strategy known as harvest now, decrypt later, attackers collect encrypted information and retain it in the expectation that future technology may permit decryption.

The consequences depend on the encryption methods involved and how long the information remains sensitive.

Customer identity records, confidential financial communications and commercially valuable information can retain their importance long after the systems used to transmit them have been replaced.

Changing the cryptography protecting future communications does not automatically protect copies of data that may already have been collected.

This gives financial institutions a reason to consider the confidentiality period of information when prioritising their migration programmes, rather than treating all cryptographic dependencies as equally urgent.

Digital signatures introduce a different concern. If a future quantum computer could undermine an algorithm used to authenticate transactions or instructions, the integrity of affected financial processes might be threatened.

Addressing that exposure requires reliable alternatives and confidence that connected systems can verify the new signatures correctly.

Blockchains face additional migration barriers

IOSCO identifies particular difficulties for blockchain systems, where cryptography is embedded in transaction validation, ownership arrangements and the operation of decentralised networks.

Unlike a centrally managed application, a blockchain may depend on agreement between independent participants before significant protocol changes can be implemented.

New cryptographic algorithms can also produce larger signatures or different processing requirements, potentially affecting transaction capacity, costs and system performance.

Those effects require practical testing because improving resistance to one category of attack should not create unacceptable operational consequences elsewhere.

Existing wallets and historical transactions may also introduce complications when determining which information and assets remain exposed after an upgrade.

The wider financial sector faces comparable coordination challenges through payment networks, market infrastructure and outsourced technology services, even where the systems involved are not decentralised.

Preparedness remains at an early stage

IOSCO's research found that much of the observed work across financial institutions and regulators is concentrated on awareness, governance, training, cryptographic inventories and preliminary migration planning.

Operational testing and deployment of quantum-resistant protections remain less advanced.

The report encourages firms to assess their exposure, develop migration plans and engage the suppliers responsible for essential systems.

Cryptographic agility is also becoming an important design consideration. Rather than embedding one algorithm so deeply that future changes require extensive redevelopment, organisations can seek architectures that permit algorithms and keys to be replaced with less disruption.

Pamplin argues that institutions should combine such flexibility with greater control over their cryptographic keys, particularly where information is processed across multiple cloud environments and jurisdictions.

Control of cryptographic keys and the choice of algorithms address different security requirements. An organisation may retain direct ownership of its keys while still relying on an algorithm that eventually needs replacement.

Conversely, a quantum-resistant algorithm does not remove the need for appropriate permissions, secure key storage and controls over administrative access.

Regulatory oversight extends beyond migration

IOSCO has also highlighted the potential for misleading claims about quantum technology, including exaggerated descriptions of products and services sometimes referred to as quantum washing.

Such claims can affect investor protection where businesses present experimental capabilities as commercially established or imply that security risks have already been resolved.

The regulator expects quantum computing to remain a priority during 2027, reflecting both the risks to established financial infrastructure and the growing commercial interest in the technology.

In the UK, financial regulators have separately published effective practices addressing quantum cyber risk and resilience, including the need for inventories, governance and migration planning.

Neither development establishes a fixed date when current cryptography will fail. Together, they reinforce the need for institutions to assess dependencies and prepare for changes that may require several years of coordinated implementation.

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